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"WORK PRODUCT" IN CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
The rights of the accused to pre-trial discovery of material in the posses-
sion of the state are expanding rapidly in many jurisdictions. This expan-
sion has been one of the most remarkable and remarked upon aspects of the
current revolution in criminal procedure.' It is all the more remarkable in
that it has been given its greatest impetus by a number of states rather than
by the federal courts.' The extent of discovery rights in most jurisdictions
is in a state of flux. Through an interaction of the statutes, court rules, and
decisional law within each state, hardly any two states have taken the same
approach to the problem of discovery in criminal cases.' Despite the growth
of discovery rights in some states, in others almost nothing in the hands of
the prosecutor is discoverable.' Further compounding the diversity of ap-
proaches is the fact that in practice there is often little uniformity even
within a single jurisdiction because of the broad discretion allowed the trial
1. See, e.g., Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?,
1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279; Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard,
1964 DUKE L.J. 477; Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L.
Rzv. 293 (1960); Fontana, Discovery in Criminal Cases-A Survey of the Proposed Rule
Changes, 25 MD. L. REv. 212 (1965); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance
of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); Kaufman, Criminal
Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in the Federal Courts, 57
COLUm. L. REv. 1113 (1957) ; Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity
for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. Rav. 127 (1962); Louisell, Criminal Dis-
covery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. Rav. 56 (1961); Tessmer, Discovery
in Texas Criminal Courts, 28 TEx. B.J. 855 (1965); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found
in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 228 (1964); Symposium, 33 F.R.D. 47 (1963);
Note, 34 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 92 (1965); Comment, 39 WASH. L. REv. 853 (1964).
2. See Krantz, supra note 1, at 140-44. Compare, e.g., DEL. SUPER. CT. (CIm.) R.
16(b) (effective as amended Jan. 1, 1965), and TEx. CODE CRIBs. PRoc. art. 39.14
(Supp. 1965), with FED. R. Cram. P. 16, 17.
3. At least part of this diversity is attributable to the Supreme Court's refusal to hold
any denial of discovery a deprivation of due process. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790 (1952).
4. See People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927);
Fletcher, supra note 1, at 304-05; Krantz, supra note 1, at 146-47.
The common law rule that a defendant is entitled to no discovery whatsoever has
generally been relaxed to the extent of allowing the trial court discretion to grant a cer-
tain amount of discovery on a proper showing by the defendant. Often, however, the
extent of the discovery which might be allowed has never been explored because this
showing requirement is quite stringent and because trial courts have simply not exercised
their discretion. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 304-05; see People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme
Court, supra at 32-33, 156 N.E. at 86.
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court, and because of the prevalence of informal discovery through prose-
cutors' cooperation with defense attorneys.'
Into the turbulent waters of criminal discovery has begun to seep the most
muddied stream of civil discovery, the qualified exemption from discovery
of an attorney's "work product." Presently, the nature of the work product
exemption in criminal discovery is unclear. To examine this growing body
of law and to infer what form it might eventually take as criminal discovery
becomes more settled, it is necessary to examine the nature of the work prod-
uct exemption in civil discovery.
I. WORK PRODUCT IN CVIL PROCEDURE
The pre-trial discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'
were adopted so that a trial in the federal courts would be "a fair contest
with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."" To
this end a litigant is entitled to discovery of information, relevant to the
subject matter of the action, which is in the possession, custody, or control
of the opposition,' unless that information is privileged.' "Relevant" has
been construed broadly.10 Admissability at trial of the information sought
is not required,1" and the restriction as to privileged matters has not been a
great hindrance.1 '2 Thus, the definition of a party's pre-trial discovery rights
in terms of relevancy has yielded a broad standard that lower federal courts
can apply with relative ease and uniformity.
The concept of attorney work product as a restriction upon discovery
rights was imposed upon this scheme in 1947, when the Supreme Court
decided the celebrated case of Hickman v. Taylor." In the Hickman case,
the party defendant and its attorney (who was not a party) refused to
answer interrogatories concerning interviews conducted by the attorney with
various prospective witnesses. Their refusal was upheld as the Supreme
Court found implicit in the rules of civil discovery a qualified exemption
for matters, not within the attorney-client privilege, which can fairly be said
5. See 8 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 16.02[2] (Cipes 1965); Traynor, supra note 1,
at 237.
6. FED. R. Crv. P. 26-37.
7. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
8. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b), 33.
9. Ibid. Discovery may also be restricted "to protect the party or witness from an-
noyance, embarrassment, or oppression." FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
10. See 2A BARRoNr & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 641, 647
(Wright ed. 1961).
11. See id. § 648.
12. See id. § 651.
13. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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to reflect "an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories.""' These matters were termed "the work product of the lawyer."' 5
This decision opened "a veritable Pandora's Box" in the realm of federal
civil discovery."' The greatest disagreement has been between supporters of
a work product doctrine limited narrowly to fact situations closely analogous
to that in Hickman v. Taylor and those championing a broader reading of
Hickman." Undaunted by the difficulties in the federal courts, most states
have adopted a work product doctrine;I s the state cases are in even greater
disarray than those which have been decided in the federal courts. The
cases disagree on all three aspects of the work product doctrine: (1) the
scope of the material protected (2) the effect of a finding that a particular
item is work product and (3) the rationale for allowing a work product
exemption.
A. Scope of Work Product
Only one characteristic of work product in civil cases has been universally
accepted as necessary: to be work product, the matter sought must be the
result of the preparation of a case for trial. 9
If the preparation for litigation criterion is met, almost anything might
be termed work product in some jurisdictions, either by case law or by stat-
utory definition. In the federal courts,2" Hickman requires that anything,
including a statement made by a potential witness, which reflects the mental
14. Id. at 508.
15. Id. at 511.
16. Viront v. Wheeling & L.E. Ry., 10 F.D.R. 45, 47 (N.D. Ohio 1950); see
Tolman, Discovery Under the Federal Rules: Production of Documents and the Work
Product of the Lawyer, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 498 (1958).
17. The first approach will be referred to as a "narrow work product doctrine." This
type of doctrine typically includes only the "work product of an attorney." A "broad
work product doctrine" is one which protects material because it reflects the thought
processes of someone other than an attorney who is connected with a party; the material
thus protected is often referred to as the "work product of a party." The federal case
formulating the broad doctrine by expanding Hickman v. Taylor was Alltmont v. United
States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950). See generally
2A BARtON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 10, § 652.2; 4 MooR, FED aAL PRAcTICE
26.23[8.-11 (1963).
18. See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 H~Av. L. REv. 940, 1045-46
(1961); Comment, The Work Product Doctrine in the State Courts, 62 MICH. L. REV.
1199 (1964).
19. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416
(D. Del. 1959); McManus v. Harkness, 11 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Hayman v.
Pullman Co., 8 F.R.D. 238 (N.D. Ohio 1948); Developments in the Law-Discovery,
74 HAtv. L. Rav. 940, 1030 (1961).
20. The doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), may cause prob-
lems here. See JAMES, CIVIL PRoCEDuRE 204 (1965).
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processes of a party's lawyer be considered work product."' All states which
have adopted a work product doctrine have followed Hickman at least to
the extent of including anything prepared by a party's lawyer as a lawyer. 2
Usually included also are those things which have not been produced by the
lawyer but nonetheless reflect his thought processes, such as statements made
to the lawyer by potential witnesses, reports of experts to the lawyer, and,
to a somewhat lesser extent, statements obtained through and reports made
by agents of the lawyer.2"
Many, perhaps most, courts have also applied the doctrine to matters
which do not reflect the thought processes of a lawyer, but do reflect those
of a party or someone connected with a party.2' These courts have gone
beyond anything explicit in Hickman and adopted this "work product of a
party" exemption as to statements of witnesses obtained by a party or by his
claim agent or investigator; some have gone so far as to include routine
statements taken by a party from employees.2"
Since the purpose of civil discovery is the ascertainment of all of the
relevant facts by the parties, any work product concept might be thought
to include only those things which reflect someone's mental processes, and
not purely factual matters. Nonetheless, a list of witnesses to an accident,
obtained by a party's agent, has been held to constitute work product
21. 329 U.S. at 511.
22. See JAmEs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 205; Comment, 62 Micir. L. Rlv. 1199(1964).
23. JAMEs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 208.
24. See 62 Mficir. L. REv. 1199, 1205 (1964). This was a position recommended
shortly before Hickman was decided:
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing obtained or
prepared by the adverse party, his surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of
litigation or in preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of production or
inspection will unfairly prejudice the party seeking the production or inspection
in preparing his claim or defense or will cause him undue hardship or injustice.
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any part of the writing
that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories,
or, except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert. Advisory Com-
mittee, Report of Proposed Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456-57 (1946).
The proposal was never adopted except insofar as the Hickman case may do so. Com-
pare 2A BAReuON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 10, § 652.2, at 130, with Clark, Ex-
perience Under the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 F.R.D. 497,
502 (1949).
25. These results have been reached either by legislative adoption of rules similar to
those proposed by the Advisory Committee, supra note 24, or by following federal cases
expanding the rule in Hickman, such as Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950). See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v.
Timmons, 61 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1952); Tzx. R. Civ. P. 167. At least fourteen states
have rules of this type. See Comment, 62 MicH. L. Rav. 1199, 1205, 1207 (1964).
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because it was obtained in anticipation of litigation." This decision marks
the outer limit of the work product doctrine.
B. Effect of Classification as Work Product
Cases which have followed the reasoning of Hickman v. Taylor have
consistently held that the consequence of finding a particular matter to be
work product is merely to give it a qualified privilege." Thus, matters
so classified are still subject to discovery upon a showing of "necessity or
justification," which is a more stringent requirement than the generally
required "good cause," and which involves a balancing of the need of the
party seeking discovery with the extent to which the matter sought con-
stitutes the work product of the resisting attorney (or party) .28 For example,
a statement taken from a prospective witness who is no longer available
may well be found discoverable on a balancing of interests; the legal
theories of the opposing attorney may never be.29 Clearly, the balancing
of interests requires a great measure of the sound discretion of the trial
court. It has been suggested that a mere showing that the material sought
will be admissible in evidence at the trial should be sufficient justification."0
On this basis, a party's own statement should always be discoverable as an
admission, even if taken by the opposing party's attorney."
A number of other states have enacted statutes giving a qualified privi-
lege to a party's written trial preparations, allowing discovery only if denial
would unfairly prejudice the preparations of the party seeking discovery or
would cause him undue hardship or injustice; giving an absolute privilege
26. Ex parte Ladon, 160 Tex. 7, 325 S.W.2d 121 (1959); see Gibilterra v. Rosemawr
Homes, 19 N.J. 166, 115 A.2d 553 (1955) (name of expert witness not discoverable).
27. See JAmzs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 208-13. Compare Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947), with Advisory Committee, Report of Proposed Amendments, 5 F.R.D.
433 (1946).
28. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947); 2A EARRON & HoLT-
zor, p, op. cit. supra note 10, § 652.4; 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 17, ff 26.23[8.-2]. The
extent of the required showing may vary inversely with the breadth of the exemption
recognized in a jurisdiction. Thus, in Alitmont v. United States, discussed at note 17
supra, the requisite showing was held to be merely "good cause" under Rule 34. Alltmont
v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 975-76 (3rd. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967
(1950).
29. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947); JAMES, op. cit. supra note 20,
at 212, 215-17.
30. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring); see
JAMzs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 211; 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 17, ff 26.23[8.-4].
31. Cannon v. Aetna Freight Lines, 11 F.R.D. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1950); JAMEs, op.
cit. supra note 20, at 212; 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 17, ff 26.23[8.-4]. However, not
all the cases have reached this result. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Reynolds, 176 F.2d
476 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
to any part of a writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions, or legal theories; and giving an absolute privilege to the
conclusions of an expert.3 2
A few states give an absolute privilege to all trial preparations.3
C. Rationale
Although there is universal agreement that the work product of a lawyer
should not be subject to discovery by an opposing party except under the
most urgent circumstances, there seems to be no such agreement as to the
reasons for this protection. Some of the reasons suggested have been: "
(1) to prevent lazy attorneys from obtaining a free ride from their oppo-
nents' diligence; 5 (2) to encourage free development of the facts of the
case, and of the theories to be applied to those facts, without fear that
everything found will be discoverable; " (3) to protect the traditional
privacy of a lawyer's trial preparations;"7 and (4) to preserve the integrity
of the lawyer as an effective advocate and an officer of the court. 8 The
first reason and the first half of the second apply with equal force to the
work product of a lawyer or a broader "work product of a party." The
other reasons support only the narrower doctrine."
II. THE PRESENT STATUS OF WORK
PRODUCT IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The civil work product doctrine (or set of doctrines encompassed by the
single term), which was born of a need felt shortly after the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were put into effect,4 was adopted along with those
Rules by numerous states. It is now being adopted in criminal cases in a
number of jurisdictions having a wide variety of approaches to criminal
discovery. In this section the extent of this adoption will be explored,
32. See Comment, 62 Mic. L. REv. 1199, 1205-06 (1964). This is the result called
for in Advisory Commitee, Report of Proposed Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456-57
(1946).
33. See Comment, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 1199, 1207 (1964).
34. See generally JAmEs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 205-06; Developments in the Law
-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. Rv. 940, 1029 (1961).
35. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring);
Walczak v. Detroit-Pittsburgh Motor Freight, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ind. 1956).
The fact that discovery is allowed on a sufficient showing of necessity, a factor which
relates to the opportunities of the moving party and which, by definition, obviates the
factor of laziness, further indicates that this is one of the purposes for the rule.
36. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (as to lawyers).
37. Id. at 510-11.
38. Id. at 511; id. at 516-18 (Jackson, J., concurring).
39. Cf. 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 17, 1 26.23[7]-.23[8.-1].
40. See JAmEs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 204; Comment, 62 MIcH. L. Ruv. 1199
(1964).
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in the context of the existing state of criminal discovery in the various
jurisdictions.'
A number of states still adhere to the common law rule that a defendant
is not entitled to discovery of anything in the hands of the state.2 By the
simple logic that one cannot exempt something from nothing, the need
for a work product doctrine seems here to be non-existent. Nonetheless, the
doctrine has been cited in these jurisdictions in support of a denial of
discovery. Arkansas, for example, has no criminal discovery statute or
rule, refuses to apply civil rules to criminal actions, and will allow a
limited discovery only by virtue of the inherent power of the trial court.
Its supreme court has still carefully explained that statements given by
witnesses to the prosecuting attorney are part of his "work papers.""' The
Indiana court has called police reports and statements by witnesses the
"working files of the state,""' although physical evidence taken from a
defendant has been denied him without the use of this reasoning.4'
In a number of jurisdictions discovery is left almost entirely to the dis-
cretion of the trial court, and a discovery order is extremely difficult to
get reversed. 6 At least in New York, if discovery has been allowed by
the trial court, a work product claim appears to be given short shrift on ap-
peal."' California, although giving trial courts considerable discretion, has
41. The study indicates the wide variety of procedural backgrounds into which
the work product concept has been introduced, as well as the variety of factual situations
to which it has been applied. The state cases expressly or implicitly relying on some
sort of work product concept are collected here. Material in the hands of the prosecutor
which might have been protected as work product in some jurisdictions has been pro-
tected in a large number of other jurisdictions on other grounds. Some of these grounds
are more or less related to the work product concept; for example, that such material
is not evidence, State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 134 S.E.2d 334, cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964) ; that such material is not a public document, but the prosecutor's quasi pri-
vate data, State v. Hill, 193 Kan. 512, 394 P.2d 106 (1964) ; or that the state has no re-
ciprocal power to probe the files of defense counsel, State v. Cocheo, 24 Conn. Supp. 377,
190 A.2d 916 (App. Div. Cir. Ct. 1962). The first attempt to collect all of the cases
has recently been made. Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 8 (1966); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 181 (1966).
42. See authorities cited note 4 supra.
43. Edens v. State, 235 Ark. 178, 179, 359 S.W.2d 432, 433, cert. denied, 371 U.S.
968 (1962).
44. Anderson v. State, 239 Ind. 372, 376, 156 N.E.2d 384, 386 (1959); see Brown
v. State, 241 Ind. 14, 158 N.E.2d 290 (1959).
45. Lander v. State, 238 Ind. 680, 154 N.E.2d 507 (1958).
46. See Krantz, supra note 1, at 149 & n.95, 151-53.
47. See People v. Horton, 19 App. Div. 2d 80, 241 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1963); People
v. Hawa, 15 App. Div. 2d 740, 224 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 718,
191 N.E.2d 904, 241 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1963). On the other hand, denial of discovery may
be supported on appeal by a work product theory. People v. Marshall, 5 App. Div. 2d
352, 172 N.Y.S.2d 237, aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 823, 159 N.E.2d 698, 188 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1958);
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guided them toward granting broad discovery rights to defendants.," It
was also the only state explicitly rejecting the work product doctrine in
civil cases,4" but that heresy has now been eradicated."0 Finally, California
has recently held that civil discovery rules have no application to criminal
cases. As a result of these unusual positions, California courts seem to be
quietly and successfully avoiding the use of a work product doctrine in
criminal cases, by following the same approach they initially took in civil
cases, and refusing to be bound by the newly imposed work product exemp-
tion in civil cases. In a recent case, the California Court of Appeals denied
an interrogation of an assistant district attorney, to interpret his scribbled
notes of an interview with a witness, but on the basis of "sound reasons
of public policy,"'" not work product.
Many jurisdictions regulate discovery, to a greater or lesser extent, by
statute or court rule. In the federal courts, a need for the work product
doctrine seems to have been largely abrogated by the Jencks Act," which
makes much which would otherwise be subject to a claim of work product
specifically not discoverable before trial and specifically discoverable-
under certain circumstances-at trial.5 3
People v. Cocoliccio, 40 Misc. 2d 1013, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (S. Ct. 1963) (dictum);
accord, Erving v. State, 174 Neb. 90, 105, 116 N.W.2d 7, 17 (1962).
48. See Lousell, supra note 1, at 74-86.
49. In 1961, the California Supreme Court, considering work product a "form of
federally created privilege," decided to take a fresh approach to the problem in civil cases:
We are therefore inclined to the view that the work product privilege does not
exist in this state. This is not to say that discovery may not be denied, in proper
cases, when disclosure of the attorney's efforts, opinions, conclusions, or theories
would be against public policy ... or would be eminently unfair or unjust, or
would impose an undue burden. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d
355, 401, 364 P.2d 266, 291, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 115 (1961).
50. In 1963, the California legislature amended the Code of Civil Procedure to
provide that, "The work product of an attorney shall not be discoverable unless ......
CAL. CiV. Paoc. CODE § 2016(b).
51. People v. Valdez, 203 Cal. App. 2d 559, 565, 21 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768 (1962).
The "sound reasons of public policy" were ascribed, inter alia, to Greyhound Corp. v.
Superior Court and Hickman v. Taylor.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). Under the Jencks Act, a witness's statement in the
possession of the government is never discoverable until the witness has testified at trial.
Memoranda which summarize a witnesss statement are never discoverable.
53. In United States v. Hillbrich, 341 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 381 U.S. 941
(1965), in which the trial court had held that "handwriting or notes" of government
counsel were part of their "work product" and thus need not be delivered in response to
defendant's broad motion to produce, the Court of Appeals reversed, stating: "There is
no 'work product' exception to the Jencks Act. If a statement taken or recorded by
government counsel falls within the definition of the Act, it must be produced." Id. at
557.
Rule 16 has just been completely revised to allow the defendant to inspect a number
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Other jurisdictions have statutes based on Rule 16 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which allows discovery of material "obtained from
or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by
process." Since this provision has generally been construed narrowly in the
federal courts, so as to exclude even a defendant's confession from its
ambit,"' nothing which might be termed work product is discoverable
unless an additional inherent power of the trial court to allow discovery
is recognized.
Such an inherent power has been recognized under the Arizona rule,
modeled on Federal Rule 16." In State ex rel. Polley v. Superior Court,"8
the trial court had granted inspection of a transcript of an interrogation of
the defendant made while he was recovering from surgery in the hospital
shortly after the crime. On review, this statement was held to be outside
the scope of the rule, but "the Rule itself does not express a policy pro-
hibiting discovery; hence, the court is free under its residual power to
permit broader discovery."57 The court was then prepared to consider
the claim of a work product exemption. It first suggested that a difficulty
with adopting the premise that a defendant's statement taken by a prose-
cutor is the prosecutor's work product lies in determining how far civil
work product extends."8 It also recognized that Hickman v. Taylor was "a
of items at the discretion of the trial court, including his confession, scientific reports,
his grand jury testimony, books, papers, documents, tangible objects, and buildings or
places. However, the rule specifically "does not authorize the discovery or inspection
of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by government
agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case," except for scienti-
fic reports. The Jencks Act still controls in the case of statements made by prospective
witnesses. The provision for work product, although not explicit, may herald a broad
use of a work product exemption in the federal courts, but this remains to be seen.
A further change in Rule 16 allows the government a protective order, on a "sufficient
showing." This provision seems to indicate that the work product provisions are to be
generally applied, even without any particular showing by the government.
A still further change allows the trial court to condition certain discovery by the
defendant on his allowing certain discovery by the government. This provision contains
a similar provision for work product. What effect on federal courts' use of the work
product doctrine this new mutuality will have also remains to be seen.
54. The Federal Rules, before their amendment, rarely yielded pre-trial inspection of
a defendant's statements recorded or written, witnesses' names and addresses, witnesses'
statements, co-defendants' statements, or scientific reports. See Symposium, 33 F.R.D.
47, 102 (1963).
55. Aamz. R. CRIM. Paoc. 195 (1956).
56. 81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1956).
57. Id. at 130, 302 P.2d at 265.
58. Finally petitioner urges that the statement in question is part of the "work
product" of the county attorney, and, hence, the trial court had no jurisdiction
to order a pre-trial inspection. The difficulty with adopting in toto this premise
is that we can find no universally accepted definition or meaning of precisely
what is embodied within the term "work product." Id. at 132, 302 P.2d at 266.
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civil case, where, admittedly, different rules apply.""9 Having thus become
the only court to recognize these fundamental problems, it then proceeded
to avoid them by quoting Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Hickman:
"It seems clear and has long been recognized that discovery should provide
a party access to anything that is evidence in his case."6 Because the
transcript was previously used at an incomplete trial of the defendant, and
seemed certain to be offered in evidence at the coming trial, this use operated
"to remove same from the full protection accorded a 'work product,'" and
the discovery order was affirmed. 1 This language might mean that material
which is admissible in evidence is never to be considered work product, or
that, although it is work product, a showing of admissibility is always a
sufficient showing of necessity. If the latter interpretation is correct, this
is also the first case to allow discovery, in a criminal case, when material
has been classified work product. 2
Polley seems to set out admissibility in evidence as the sole test of dis-
coverability, outside of its court rule. Thus, in Arizona, when the item
sought is not evidence, inspection may be denied on that ground alone;6"
but when it is shown to be admissible evidence, a claim of work product
protection may be rejected.6" However, a vaguely worded subpoena, asking
for all "evidence relating to any charge in the complaint," was regarded
as "an attempt to go on a 'fishing expedition,' probably in order to obtain
the 'work product' of the county attorney."6
59. Id. at 132, 302 P.2d at 267.
60. Id. at 133, 302 P.2d at 267, quoting 329 U.S. at 515. It assumed, apparently,
that the same rule was stated for criminal cases in a legal encyclopedia, quoting 17 Am.
JUR., Discovery and Inspection § 25 (1938):
In no case is there any suggestion that jurisdiction to compel production for in-
spection of papers or documents can properly be extended to notes or memoranda
in possession of the prosecutor which are inadmissible as evidence either for the
prosecution or for the defense or of any other papers and documents that are not
admissible as evidence in the prosecution of the accused. State ex rel. Polley v.
Superior Court, 81 Ariz. 127, 133, 302 P.2d 263, 267 (1956).
61. Ibid.
62. Some courts have indicated that discovery of material classified work product
might have been allowed on a proper showing. State v. Shouse, 177 So. 2d 724, 731
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); State v. Aubuchon, 381 S.W.2d 807, 814 (Mo. 1964).
63. State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101, 107, 370 P.2d 261, 265 (1962) (lie detector report
"was not and could not be evidence in itself").
64. In State ex tel Helm v. Superior Court, 90 Ariz. 133, 138, 367 P.2d 6, 9 (1961),
a defendant was allowed discovery of the medical report of a blood alcohol test because
"this was not an attempt to discover the 'work product' of the prosecutor."
65. State v. Colvin, 81 Ariz. 388, 391-92, 307 P.2d 98, 101 (1957). Another case
in which the admissibility test was not applied was State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior
Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1956), in which the court said: "[T]he defendant in
enumerating the items he wanted to inspect included private memoranda, i.e. the 'work
product of the prosecutor', as well as tangible physical objects . .. ." Id. at 76, 275 P.2d
at 888.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss3/3
"WORK PRODUCT" IN CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
New Jersey has a criminal discovery rule modeled upon, but slightly
extending, Federal Rule 16.6 In State v. Tune,"7 denial of discovery of
statements made by the defendant and witnesses was based largely on a
civil statute which followed the proposal of the federal Advisory Committee
in 1946."' This statute gives work product exemption in civil cases to "any
writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party . . . in anticipation of
litigation." Even the now famous Brennan dissent conceded that the state-
ments made by witnesses should be protected as work product by analogy
to the civil rule."
Before 1964, the Delaware Superior Court denied inspection of witnesses'
statements, police investigation reports, polygraph tests, blood tests, or
fingerprint examinations held by the attorney general, on the ground that
it saw "no sufficient reason" to do otherwise.7" When information was
gained as the product of a "general investigation of crime," it was generally
not discoverable, even though the source was a co-defendant."'
Against this background of restrictive judicial interpretation, two events
in 1964-a Superior Court case and amendments to the discovery rule-
provide an interesting study. In State v. Winsett72 the Superior Court
relaxed slightly the previous approach that all "fruits of detection and
collection by police" were not subject to discovery, but still insisted that
the "work product of detection," as opposed to the mere gathering or col-
lecting of tangibles, was protected. 3 The "work product of detection" was
defined as the intangible information which comes into the possession of the
police "as the result of analysis, comparison, detection, and the like";'4 by
this criterion an autopsy report was held not discoverable.
When Delaware Rule 16 was amended to liberalize the defendant's
opportunities, an inclusive list of scientific reports or examinations (in-
cluding autopsy reports) and the recorded testimony of the defendant
66. N.J. RULES 3:5-11.
67. 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
68. See notes 24-25 supra.
69. 13 N.J. at 231-32, 98 A.2d at 896. An earlier case had suggested that "confes-
sions, investigation reports and statements of witnesses obtained in a criminal prosecution
might well be classed as 'the work product of the prosecutor' and granted protection
against inspection by the defense in advance of trial." State v. Bunk, 63 A.2d 842, 845
(Essex County [N.J.] Ct. 1949).
70. State v. Thompson, 50 Del. 456, 134 A.2d 266 (Super. Ct. 1957).
71. In State v. Minor, 54 Del. 1385, 177 A.2d 215 (Super. Ct. 1962), Rule 61 was
said to apply "specifically" and not to general information gathered before the police
know to what proceeding it might be applied.
72. 200 A.2d 237 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964).
73. Id. at 239.
74. Ibid.
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before the grand jury were made available, in addition to items previously
allowed. 5 Statements and confessions were made discoverable if they were
relevant and in the possession or control of the state. The most significant
change was the addition of subsection (b):
This subdivision does not authorize the discovery or inspection of re-
ports, memoranda, or other internal State documents made by agents
in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, except
as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule, or of statements made by
State witnesses or prospective State witnesses (other than the defendant
or a co-defendant) to agents of the State."
This change in the rules made Delaware the first state to deal with the
work product exemption in a discovery rule. Though it does not expressly
call them "work product," the rule does place what it calls "reports,
memoranda, or other internal State documents" outside the rather broad
array of specifically discoverable documents.
Discovery statutes and rules in other jurisdictions show varying scope
and liberality. A recent Texas statute gives a defendant in a criminal case
discovery rights in terms almost identical to those given a party in a civil
suit, except that it further specifically exempts from discovery "the work
product of counsel in the case and their investigators and their notes or
report.""7 This is the first statute expressly incorporating the work product
concept into criminal procedure.
Colorado, by court rule, provides for production, after a witness's direct
testimony, of his statement in the possession of the prosecutor, 8 but this
rule does not authorize inspection of "worksheets or trial notes made in
preparation for the trial."7
A Florida statute permits inspection of statements and confessions by the
defendant, " but has been narrowly construed." Discovery of a witness's
statement is denied unless it was made before a magistrate," this denial
75. The list of reports includes "written reports of autopsies, ballistics tests, finger-
print analyses, handwriting analyses, blood, urine and breath tests, and written reports
of physical or mental examination of the defendant or the alleged victim by a physician,
dentist or psychologist made in connection with the particular case .... " DEL. SUPER.
CT. (CRIm.) R. 16(a) (2) (effective as amended Jan. 1, 1965).
76. DEL. SUPER. CT. (CraM.) R. 16(b) (effective as amended Jan. 1, 1965).
77. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 39.14 (1966); see TEx. R. Civ. P. 167.
78. CoLo. R. CRim. P. 16(b).
79. Hopper v. People, 152 Colo. 405, 410, 382 P.2d 540, 543 (1963).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.05 (Supp. 1965).
81. The statute is said to apply only to verbatim notes or nonverbatim notes which
were approved and accepted by the defendant. 1964 FLA. ATr'" GEN. BIENNIAL REP.
064-16.
82. See Jackman v. State, 140 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
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being justified in one case in terms of a work product exemption."3 When
secret recordings were made of the defendant's conversations with third
persons who later were to testify at the trial, the tapes were held to be the
work product of the prosecuting attorney,"' thus creating an exception to
another statute, which allows inspection of evidence which relates to "docu-
ments, papers ... or other tangible things .... ""
A defendant in New Hampshire attempted to subpoena a chief of police
and two of his subordinates to obtain depositions and to inspect "all written
statements, investigations, reports, and laboratory reports" in their posses-
sion." The court stated that it was unfamiliar with the exact nature of
the materials sought, or whether they were obtained while the police merely
represented the state or were procured under the direction of the attorney
general after he took charge of the prosecution; but, "In either case they
become the property or work product of the State as a party, and as such
would have been privileged from discovery even under the rule of procedure
in civil cases."8" This "privilege" was really unnecessary since discovery
was not authorized expressly at that time by statute or common law in
New Hampshire. In 1965 the court changed its position and adopted a
narrow work product doctrine. State v. Superior Court"8 defined work
product as "notes personally compiled by law enforcement authorities in
the course of their investigation, even if they include notes of conversations
with the accused . . ." and limited the application of this exemption, in
the case of notes made under the direction of a medical referee in the
course of preparing an autopsy report, to those notes made by or on behalf
of the attorney general.8 " Thus, the defendant got more than a simplified
83. Bedami v. State, 112 So. 2d 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
84. Peel v. State, 154 So. 2d 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
986 (1963).
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.04 (Supp. 1965). In State v. Shouse, 177 So. 2d 724
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), the court declared that documents and legal papers
which the state intended to use at the trial were "substantially in accord with the statute,"
but the same court denied discovery of a witness's sworn statement, citing the work
product doctrine applied to such statements in a civil case.
86. State ex rel. Regan v. Superior Court, 102 N.H. 224, 225, 153 A.2d 403, 404
(1959). The defendant's attempt was pursuant to N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 517:13
(1955).
87. State ex rel. Regan v. Superior Court, supra note 86, at 227, 153 A.2d at 405.
88. 106 N.H. 228, 208 A.2d 832 (1965).
89. Id. at 230, 208 A.2d at 834. But cf. State v. Healey, 106 N.H. 308, 210
A.2d 486 (1965). In the Healey case, decided less than two months after State v. Su-
perior Court, the same justice quoted with approval a Note on the civil work product
doctrine, 62 McH. L. Rev. 1199, 1200 (1964): "The 'work product doctrine is con-
cemed with protecting a party's trial preparations from disclosure under the modem
discovery procedures.'" State v. Healey, 106 N.H. 308, 309, 210 A.2d 486, 487 (1965).
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autopsy report, but any specific conclusions in regard to the attorney
general's investigation were protected."
Past decisions in Missouri have limited discovery to items admissible in
evidence,9 and have denied inspection of material useful for impeachment
purposes only.92 Concern has been shown that a search for statements may
constitute an improper prying into an adversary's preparation for trial."
In a recent case it was said of a policeman's report and his statement to
the warrant officer: "Documents such as those sought here are written as
a part of the initial preparation of the State, in contemplation of a prosecu-
tion. Whether expressly so made by statute or rule or not, there remains
in them inherently an element of work product, and perhaps of privilege."'
Since this case was decided, a modest discovery rule was promulgated with
no mention of any work product exemption.9"
In Oregon, a civil procedure discovery statute has been applied to a
criminal case through the medium of another statute making the law of
evidence in civil actions applicable in criminal cases,99 but apparently no
controversy over a work product exemption has, as yet, arisen."
III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WORK
PRODUCT IN CRIMINAL DISCOvERY
The term "w6rk product" has already been applied to nearly every type
of material in the possession of the state. The various courts which have
The defendant was then given portions of a hospital sanity report and a fire marshall's
report because these were no more work product than an autopsy report. The trial
court was given discretion to balance the interests of the parties in deciding whether to
allow inspection of portions of the hospital report and such portions of the fire marshall's
report "as contain the marshall's conclusion with respect to the cause and origin of the
fire."
90. The defendant was allowed inspection of "contemporaneous notes," photographs,
movies, or slides made as a part of the autopsy, and parts or contents of the corpse in
addition to the ten-page autopsy report furnished pursuant to N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
611:11-:13 (1955). The death certificate was furnished pursuant to § 611:16.
91. State ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959); State v. Hinojosa,
242 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1951).
92. State v. Simon, 375 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1964); State v. Kelton, 299 S.W.2d 493
(Mo. 1957).
93. State v. McDonald, 342 Mo. 998, 119 S.W.2d 286 (1938).
94. State v. Aubuchon, 381 S.W.2d 807, 814 (Mo. 1964).
95. Mo. R. Cram. P. 25 (effective Dec. 1, 1965). The rule provides that the trial
judge may order inspection of relevant written or recorded statements or confessions
made by the defendant, and relevant results or reports of physical or mental examinations.
96. State v. Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 790 (1952),
applied the civil discovery rule, now ORE REv. STAT. § 41.615 (1959), through ORE.
CoD. L. ANN. § 26.932 (now ORE. REv. STAT. § 136.510 (1959)).
97. This theoretically interesting problem may never arise, because the Oregon civil
discovery statute makes discovery purely discretionary. ORE. RPv. STAT. § 41.615 (1959).
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used a work product exemption to protect such material have done so in
the context of a wide variety of systems of criminal procedure and criminal
discovery rules. In all of these jurisdictions, however, whenever a court
has protected a particular item as work product, it has had at its disposal
other, longer-recognized grounds upon which it could have denied discovery.
Therefore, to date, there has been no need for a work product doctrine to
protect the material which courts have wanted to protect. Such a need is
not the only basis for wanting to incorporate a work product doctrine,
however. A state may want some sort of work product doctrine, broad or
narrow, either as a concept which better fits the results it is presently
reaching and wishes to reach in the future, or to hold in reserve as an
ultimate barrier to the greatly expanded discovery rights which defendants
may eventually be given."
A. Rationale
The wide variations among jurisdictions both in criminal discovery and
in civil work product doctrines make comments about the wisdom of apply-
ing the civil work product concept to criminal cases difficult. It is nonethe-
less clear that no work product concept should be applied to material in the
hands of a prosecutor without some consideration of the similarities and
differences between its use in civil and criminal cases.9 What justifications
does this transplantation have? What are its dangers?
The first place to look for justification for a work product doctrine in
criminal discovery is its justification in civil discovery. Are the same argu-
ments still forceful?
Two rationales support a broad work product doctrine. The "free ride"
rationale carries considerably less weight in a criminal case than in a civil
case. A defendant's presumption of innocence should include a presump-
tion that he does not have equal knowledge of the facts to be alleged by
the prosecution."' Furthermore, in almost no jurisdiction does he have
the means which are available in a civil case for obtaining information
independently -for example, the taking of statements of witnesses through
compulsory deposition proceedings. 1 ' No statistics are available on the
98. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. Rv.
56 (1961).
99. The general considerations which distinguish criminal discovery from civil dis-
covery are quite adequately discussed in the authorities cited in note 1 supra.
100. Cf. Petition of DiJoseph, 394 Pa. 19, 27, 145 A.2d 187, 190 (1958) (Musmanno,
J., concurring). But ci. Morrissey, Escobedo's European Ancestors, 52 A.B.A.J. 723
(1966).
101. Missouri is a notable exception in that it allows a defendant to take depositions
of prospective state witnesses. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 545.380 (1959); Mo. R. CmPM. P. 25.10;
see Rabbitt, Criminal Discovery in Missouri, St. Louis B.J., Spring 1966, p. 11, 17-18.
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incidence of laziness among defense attorneys, but it seems that no great
increase would be caused by allowing them more information with which
to work."°2
The other rationale which supports a broad work product exemption,
that it encourages free development of the facts by each party, may be
more relevant. Anything which discourages the state from developing leads
which might prove exculpatory is clearly detrimental to our system of
criminal law.113 It has been said that allowing discovery of memoranda,
written statements, and the like would result in the police's never committing
to paper much that is now written down.'0 Precisely this materia] might
be protected from discovery by a broad work product exemption. "'
The reasons for protecting the work product of an attorney in a civil
case are in one sense easy to transfer to the work product of a prosecuting
attorney. Protecting his privacy and preserving his role in court as an
effective advocate are to some extent as valid reasons for protecting a
prosecuting attorney's work product as for protecting any other attorney's
work product.
Even this basis for protection is not borne out by any exact correspond-
ence between the position of a lawyer for a private litigant in a civil case
and that of a prosecuting attorney in a criminal case. There are differences
both in that a criminal proceeding differs from a civil case and in that a
prosecuting attorney is also a public official. A criminal proceeding differs
from a civil case in the lesser degree of freedom given to a plaintiff to
develop novel factual and legal theories, to bring suit on the basis of half-
formed factual theories, or to plead inconsistently.'00 A prosecutor thus
has less need for protecting the privacy of his factual and legal theories
than has a lawyer in a civil case. In his capacity as a public official, the
prosecutor has a duty to see that justice is done rather than to win his
case for his client. This duty acts as a limitation on the adversary system
in criminal cases. To the extent that the adversary procedure is modified,
102. See Louisell, supra note 98, at 94-96.
103. Cf. Note, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 68. The extent to which police and prosecutors
would simply allow a defendant to develop his own case if their efforts were discover-
able is, of course, not known. There is probably not much of a threat both because of
their sense of justice and because of the pressures on them not to try an innocent man.
104. See Louisell, supra note 98, at 91-92. Again, the seriousness of the threat is not
really known, partly because if carried out it could cut both ways by leading to surprise
of the prosecution at trial by its own witnesses.
105. Louisell suggests a possible need for work product protection for prosecutors on
this ground. Ibid.
106. But cf. Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 940, 1061-62
(1961).
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arguments based on the needs of an adversary system, such as those elo-
quently expressed in Hickman v. Taylor, are weakened.
In addition to the arguments which have been used to support a work
product doctrine, the Supreme Court's response to an argument made by
the petitioner seeking discovery in Hickman v. Taylor should be considered.
The argument was that a rule protecting the work product of an attorney
would tend to work to the advantage of certain classes of parties, notably
corporations with large legal staffs.'07 It was dismissed by the Court on a
ground which applies equally to such an argument made against any kind
of civil work product doctrine: that discovery must apply workably to
"'any party, individual or corporate, plaintiff or defendant," and "in light
of the limitless situations where the particular kind of discovery sought by
petitioner might be used."'08
Neither half of the Court's response is applicable to criminal discovery.
In criminal discovery there is no single discovery rule applied to both
parties," 9 and there seems to be no good reason to attempt to formulate
such a rule. The Court's explanation that discovery rules must apply to all
types of parties also fails because in a criminal case only one class of plain-
tiffs exists, invariably having a staff of lawyers and investigators. Similarly,
in a criminal case, the types of information in the possession of the prosecutor
are relatively limited. This is in part due to the relatively few types of
issues presented in all criminal cases taken together, in part due to the fact
that there is only one potential plaintiff instead of a limitless number, and
in part due to the unique nature of the state as a party in a criminal case.
Unlike a private party, the state, in its law enforcement capacity, has as
its regular course of business preparation for the possible trial of persons
with whom it deals. Therefore, whereas in civil cases an opposing party
may have in his possession a large amount of material which was not
created in anticipation of litigation but in the regular course of business, a
prosecutor will usually have in his posession only material which is broadly
the result of the state's preparation for litigation. This material can be
classified as physical evidence and communications. The former has merely
been obtained in anticipation of litigation, but the latter have, to some
extent, been prepared by some agent of the state in anticipation of litigation.
Thus, at least as to the latter material, the essential criterion for classification
as work product is almost always met.
107. 329 U.S. at 506.
108. 329 U.S. at 507.
109. Even those rules which call for reciprocity have separate discovery rules for the
state and the defendant. See FED. R_ CPam. P. 16.
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B. Possible Approaches to a Work Product Doctrine
in Criminal Procedure
The fact that almost anything but physical evidence in the hands of
the prosecutor might be considered work product means that almost every-
thing which a defendant might want to discover could be protected in
this way. Included would be communications, made to or taken by an
agent of the state, made by prospective witnesses, the defendant, the prose-
cutor, experts, police, or grand juries. If all of these items are not to be
protected indiscriminately by a work product doctrine, careful definition
of the extent of the doctrine is necessary. Two basic approaches to defining
the scope of a criminal work product concept are possible. One approach
would be that taken in civil discovery: defining work product as including
specific items, such as "statements of prospective witnesses taken by an
attorney." The other approach, which would be more subtle and difficult
to administer, would cut across any list of items by defining a work product
exemption in terms of the quantum of involvement of the mental processes
of the prosecutor or his agents, such as "those portions of items which
reflect merely the thought processes of the prosecting attorney." Which
of these approaches is superior depends to a large extent on the discretion
which a rule-making court or legislature wants to give trial courts, and
cannot be answered at all without examining the possible techniques by
which a work product exemption can be defined in criminal procedure.
1. Techniques for Defining the Scope of Work Product
a. work product defined by analogy to civil work product. The most com-
mon method of introducing a work product doctrine into a state's criminal
procedure has been for a court to deny discovery on the basis of a work
product exemption in a given case. Other states have applied all their civil
discovery rules to criminal cases. A similar approach would be to have a
general rule allowing discovery, but exempting work product. With any
of these approaches, the use of the term "work product" leads almost
irresistably to a process of defining work product, item by item, by analogy
to the state's civil work product doctrine. The extent of such a work product
exemption will vary, of course, with the state's civil work product doctrine.
Physical evidence never reflects an opinion formed by anyone in anticipa-
tion of litigation, and thus should never be protected as work product even
though it was obtained as part of the state's trial preparation. It seems
no attempt has been made to do so.
Statements made to the prosecutor by prospective witnesses would seem
always to fall within the scope of even a narrow work product doctrine,
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on the basis of Hickman v. Taylor.1  A number of cases have so held."'
Whether or not other statements in the possession of the prosecutor are
considered work product would depend on the approach used in the
analogous civil situation and the strength of the specific analogy. It is
significant that although relatively few jurisdictions have as yet used the
term "work product" in a criminal case, those which have used it have
already collectively classified as work product statements made by defend-
ants, 12 prosecutors,"' experts," and the police. " Grand jury transcripts
seem to reflect the opinion of the grand jury and thus to be the work
product of the grand jury. The ambiguous relationship between the grand
jury and the state and prosecutor, and the lack of any analogous situation
in civil cases make the application of civil work product problematical.
Just how broad a civil work product precedent a court might feel is needed
before grand jury transcripts would fall within it, if indeed a civil precedent
were needed at all, is difficult to predict. No court has yet seemed to make
the attempt."' The identity of possible witnesses, including experts, could
be considered work product only by analogy to the civil cases allowing
the broadest of work product concepts."' However, the presence of a
110. See notes 16-19, 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
111. See Edens v. State, 235 Ark. 178, 359 S.W.2d 432, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 968
(1962); People v. Valdez, 203 Cal. App. 2d 559, 21 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1962); State v.
Shouse, 177 So. 2d 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Brown v. State, 241 Ind. 14, 158
N.E.2d 290 (1959). Contra, People v. Hawa, 15 App. Div. 2d 740, 224 N.Y.S.2d 156,
157 (1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 718, 191 N.E.2d 904, 241 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1963).
112. Peel v. State, 154 So. 2d 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 986
(1963) (made to third party); State ex rel. Regan v. Superior Court, 102 N.H. 224,
225, 153 A.2d 403, 404 (1959) (dictum).
113. State ex el. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 76, 275 P.2d 887, 888
(1956).
114. State v. Winsett, 200 A.2d 237, 239 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964) (probably overruled
by DEL. SuPEaR. CT. (Canm.) R. 16(b)); State ex rel. Regan v. Superior Court, 102
N.H. 224, 225, 153 A.2d 403, 404 (1959). But see State v. Superior Court, 90 Ariz.
133, 367 P.2d 6 (1961).
115. State v. Aubuchon, 381 S.W.2d 807, 814 (Mo. 1964); see Brown v. State, 241
Ind. 14, 158 N.E.2d 290 (1959).
116. Other protection of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings may make a work
product claim unnecessary. This protection may be in the form of a statute or of the
grand jury's traditional secrecy. See FED. R. CRim. P. 6(e); 8 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TizC 1 6.05 (Cipes 1965); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1184 n.116 (1960); Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 HAuv. L. Rxv. 940, 1012, 1056 (1961); cf. 4 MooRn, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 26.25[6.-3] (1963).
117. One of the states with such a broad work product doctrine is Texas. See Ex
parts Ladon, 160 Tex. 7, 325 S.W.2d 121 (1959). For a suggestion that under a new
criminal statute lists of witnesses will be protected as work product in Texas criminal
cases see Tessmer, Discovery in Texas Criminal Courts, 28 TEx. B.J. 855 (1965). See
note 77 supra and accompanying text.
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generally recognized informer privilege reduces the state's need for work
product protection in this area.118
In some few jurisdictions, the material which would fall within a work
product exemption defined by analogy to civil precedents might coincide
nicely with at least some of the material which the state is trying to protect,
without unduly limiting discovery of other material. However, the differ-
ence in underlying rationales between the work product exemption in civil
discovery and the protection of the state's material in criminal discovery
makes a good fit unlikely. Furthermore, the broader the work product
exemption is allowed to become in criminal cases, the more purely fortuitous
any such fit becomes. In a jurisdiction which recognizes a broad civil
work product exemption, virtually anything which a defendant might seek
to discover could be withheld as the work product of the state, without
the court's taking into account the true policy considerations.1
b. work product defined for criminal discovery purposes. The surest way
for a state to make a work product exemption coincide with particular
material it wants protected is to protect "work product" from discovery
and, at the same time, define "work product" for the purposes of criminal
discovery as being that particular material. If the definition is in terms
of a list of specific items which is merely exemplary, a process of analogy
both to the list and to civil work product seems inevitable; if the list is
meant to be exhaustive, the use of the term "work product" at all would
serve only to confuse.
Another possible definition of work product is in terms of "internal
memoranda of the state." Although the basis of this concept is not entirely
coextensive with that of work product, if an exemption from discovery
were put in terms of internal memoranda instead of work product, the
material protected would amount to a broad work product exemption,
defined by the type of item.
A third method of defining work product, whether the actual term is
used or not, is to frame the exception in terms of material which "reflects
the mental processes" of a prosecuting attorney, or of other agents of the
state. Because everything in the possession of the state can be said to reflect
to some extent the impressions of some agent of the state, a more desirable
way to define work product in criminal discovery would be as "material
which merely reflects" the theories, opinions, or conclusions of the prose-
118. See Goldstein, supra note 116, at 1185 n.118; cf. 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note
116, 1 26.25[6.-2].
119. These considerations are well presented in the authorities cited in note I supra.
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cutor, or, perhaps, of agents of the state.12 This proposal, which is clearly
a "quantum of involvement" approach rather than a classification by type
of item approach, has the advantage of preserving the most important
part of the work product doctrine from the point of view of the prosecutor,
while preventing the doctrine from expanding unduly. It could, however,
create difficult problems of administration. What type of writing reflects
merely thought processes? Can thought processes be separated from facts
in a given writing without denying the defendant some of the facts? Who
is to decide what part of the material in the prosecutor's hands reflects
merely thoughts? One solution would be to frame a rule which put the
burden on the state to separate work product from the rest of a writing,
under the supervision of the trial court. Of course, even if satisfactory
solutions to the administrative problems could be formulated, the basic
question remaining is whether this material should be protected.
c. work product used in conjunction with specifically discoverable material.
Another way to limit the possible scope of work product in criminal dis-
covery is not only to protect work product but also to provide specifically
that certain items, which might otherwise be protected as work product,
are discoverable under specified circumstances. Three basic approaches of
this sort can be taken. It is not essential to any of them that the source of
the list of discoverable items and the source of the work product be the
same. The first approach is to provide that except for the specified items,
work product is protected. This approach assures discovery of the most
common items which the rule-making court or legislature wants to be dis-
coverable. As to items not specified, work product will probably be
interpreted exactly as if the list of discoverable items were nonexistent. If
work product is not defined, it will probably expand by analogy to civil
cases to cover almost everything not specified; if it is defined by a quantum
of the prosecutor's mental efforts, each item not specified will have to be
passed upon on its own merits.
A second approach is to provide that the specification of discoverable
items does not authorize the discovery of work product. If a court con-
siders the question of when an item specified might or might not be work
product, it seems certain that it will quickly realize that this approach calls
for a definition of work product in terms of the quantum of the prosecutor's
mental efforts which went into the particular item in question, at least as
to the specified items. If work product is not specifically defined in these
terms, there might be more of a tendency as to items specified to consider
120. This approach was taken in the recently proposed Missouri Code of Criminal
Procedure at Title IX, § 3(3) (1964), but has now been abandoned.
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entire documents work product or not, rather than consider what parts
of a document are and are not work product. This would be unfortunate,
because it would tend to allow the defendant to discover scientific reports,
for example, when they were not an essential part of the case, but to deny
their discovery whenever they were crucial enough to the case that the
prosecutor directed their preparation.
A third approach is to provide that work product is not normally dis-
coverable, without relating this statement to the specified discoverable
items. This approach is likely to occur when the work product exemption
is announced in a decision, particularly if the discoverable items were also
specified in the prior case law, although a single rule could be drafted
this way. The added ambiguity implicit in such a rule is immediately
apparent. When an item falls within a court's definition of work product,
but is also made specifically discoverable, it is unlikely that the court will
use the work product doctrine to subvert the purpose of the rule. Nonethe-
less, it could reach any of the results reached under the two approaches
discussed above. Furthermore, it could broaden discovery rights beyond
those obtained under either of the above approaches, by reasoning that if
the specified material is discoverable, and therefore not work product,
then the item under consideration is similarly not work product. The
breadth of the possible results of this approach to work product makes
it a risky one.
d. work product rejected. Having considered the weaknesses in the ration-
ale supporting work product in criminal cases, the possible difficulties in
administering a work product doctrine, and the general policy considera-
tions in granting or denying discovery, 2" a state might well decide that
rejecting the work product doctrine, per se, in criminal discovery would
keep the true policy considerations to the fore. The language of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court would be
appropriate:
We are therefore inclined to the view that the work product privilege
does not exist in this state. This is not to say that discovery may not
be denied, in proper cases, when disclosure of the attorney's efforts,
opinions, conclusions, or theories would be against public policy . . .
or would be eminently unfair or unjust, or would impose an undue
burden. 2
Although this was a civil case, the same approach is quite as valid in a
criminal case. The California court's characterization of work product
121. See authorities cited note 1 supra.
122. 56 Cal. 2d 355, 401, 364 P.2d 266, 291, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 115 (1961).
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as "a form of federally created privilege" -3 seems to indicate that it did
not want to adopt into its procedure a concept which had already been
developed under a different system of procedure. The same reservation
could be expressed in a case refusing to adopt the work product doctrine
in criminal procedure by characterizing work product as "a concept
developed for the special needs of civil procedure." This approach would
allow protection of a prosecutor's work papers in a proper case, without
unthinkingly restricting other discovery either systematically or capriciously.
2. Approaches to Defining the Effect of Classification as Work Product
Of course, the effect of any of these approaches on discovery opportunities
can be varied widely by the choice of effect to be given to a finding that
certain material is work product. A state which has a very broad work
product exemption but allows discovery of work product on a showing of
necessity may in fact be granting broader discovery opportunities to defend-
ants than a state which has a relatively narrow exemption but grants
absolute immunity to anything which falls within the exemption.
In a state which allows discovery not as a matter of right but only at
the discretion of the trial court on a proper showing, a work product
exemption, if it has any meaning at all, must mean that for such material
the standard for a proper showing is higher. Unless the standard for non-
work product material is quite low, for instance as low as the showing of
"relevancy" under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a higher standard
for work product will tend to be impossible to meet; that is to say, work
product will be expressly or impliedly immune from discovery. On the
other hand, although a state which allows discovery of some material as
a matter of right can make a meaningful distinction between that material
and work product by allowing discovery of work product only at the
discretion of a trial court, such a state could also make work product
absolutely immune from discovery. Again, the interaction between scope
and effect is apparent.
If the principles of civil work product are applied to criminal discovery,
it seems clear that a statement made by the defendant (such as a confession)
in the hands of the prosecutor should not be protected merely because it is
classified work product, since its usefulness as evidence should be sufficient
justification for its production.' It is possible that the oft-remarked upon
123. Ibid.
124. See notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text. This was essentially the result
reached in State ex rel. Polley v. Superior Court, 81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1956),
discussed in notes 51-57 supra and accompanying text. Most courts have not taken this
position once a confession has been classified work product. If the defendant's state-
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reluctance of witnesses to talk to a defense attorney after making a statement
to the state constitutes sufficient necessity to allow discovery of such state-
ments. 2 ' This and other situations in which the difference in investigative
opportunities between state and defendant becomes apparent may call
for a finding of sufficient necessity in all such cases or for allowing trial
judges a great deal of discretion.'26 Whether trial courts will be left with
broad discretion to balance the interests of defendant and state when and
if criminal work product is widely adopted remains a crucial unanswered
question.
CONCLUSION
The civil work product doctrine is an attempt to set out in broad terms
an exception to the broad and generally stated discovery provisions of civil
procedure. The more modest needs of criminal discovery, in terms of the
variety of situations to which it must apply, call for either a more specifically
stated general rule or a more specifically stated work product exception.
This is particularly true because of the peculiar position of the state as a
party, which makes almost all of the material in its possession potentially
work product.
Having considered not only the needs of the state and prosecutor but
the variety of needs of defendants, a state should either reject the work
product doctrine in criminal discovery and rely on other means for protect-
ing material in the hands of the prosecutor, or set out with particularity
either what is work product or what is not and the showing required to
obtain discovery in either case.
ment is taken by the prosecutor, it may never be discoverable in a number of states
under this approach. See notes 32-33 supra.
One way to circumvent rules which seem to deny access to confessions is to follow
Louisiana, which early held that denial of discovery in this single instance would be a
denial of the due process guaranteed by the state constitution. State v. Dorsey, 207 La.
928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945).
125. See, e.g., Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 228, 236 (1964).
126. The lack of such a safety outlet, particularly in a state with a broad criminal
work product doctrine, could clog the channels of discovery. For example, the absolute
immunity for work product predicted under a new Texas statute could prove difficult to
live with. See Tessmer, supra note 117, at 899, discussing Tax. CoDE Calm. PRo. art.
39.14 (1966). Although a work product doctrine which gives trial judges power to
allow discovery on a proper showing allows guided discretion, the same result, or a
superior one, can be achieved without any work product doctrine at all, simply by allow-
ing protective orders on motion by the prosecutor. See FED. R. Clun. P. 16(e).
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